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The Empirical Case for Judicial Review: Judges as 
Agents and Judges as Trustees 
 
 
Abstract 
Lawyers, constitutional theorists and political philosophers continue to disagree over the 
merits and legitimacy of judicial review – the power of judges, now recognized by many 
constitutions around the world, to disallow democratically enacted laws. Borrowing insights 
from delegation theory, industrial organization as well as empirical accounts of judicial 
behaviour, this paper assesses two distinct approaches to the justification of judicial review: 
(1) Following the Principal-Agent Model, judges are given the authority to review and 
invalidate legislation to enforce the choices of the constitutional framers over recalcitrant 
legislative majorities. (2) By contrast, under the Trustee Model, judges are given the power of 
judicial review to act as trustees of the political system: their task is to ensure that the 
legislative process produces the “best” outcomes or, at least, policies that are Pareto-optimal. 
While showing how the two models relate to traditional understandings of the role of judges, 
the paper assesses the extent to which the organizational setting of courts and the judges’ 
incentive structure ensure that judicial review works as each model prescribes. It is argued 
that, from an empirical standpoint, justifying judicial review is easier – albeit by no means 
unproblematic – under the Trustee than under the Principal-Agent Model. The institutional 
design of most courts invested with the power of judicial review does more to ensure output 
legitimacy than to ensure that judges confine themselves to the task of enforcing the 
determinations of the constitutional framers. 
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From America to Europe, and from Europe to the rest of the world, judicial review – the 
practice of allowing judges to reverse the choices of democratically elected officials – has 
become a defining feature of global constitutionalism. In places as diverse as India, Israel, 
Canada, the United States, South Africa, France, Germany or Hungary, judges have become 
major political actors, with judicial review affecting virtually every facet of public and 
private life (Tate and Vallinder 1995; Hirschl 2004; Ginsburg 2003; Stone Sweet 2000; 
Volcansek 2001; Vanberg 2005; Sadurski 2005, 2006: 13-18).  
Even so, more than two hundred years after Marbury v. Madison judicial review 
remains an eminently contentious practice. Lawyers, constitutional theorists and political 
philosophers continue to disagree over the merits and legitimacy of judicial review and the 
proper place of judges in democratic societies. The debate has spawned a vast literature, with 
countless essays written in defence of the institution (Dworkin 1985, 1986, 1990, 1996; 
Ackermann 1998; Kelsen 1928, 1931) and new normative theories of judicial review steadily 
adding to the existing stock (Bickel 1961; Ely 1980; Kumm 2009; Eisgruber 2001; 
Waluchow 2007). Meanwhile, long on the defensive, the detractors of “legal 
constitutionalism” are striking back, reinvigorated by the work of scholars such as Jeremy 
Waldron and Richard Bellamy (Waldron 1999, 2005; Bellamy 2007; see also Tushnet 2000; 
Kramer 2004).  
Rich, the literature on judicial review also stands out for its philosophical 
sophistication. Yet this literature and the participants in the normative debate in general have 
failed to appreciate the empirical dimension of the issue. What is claimed in support or in 
opposition to judicial review rests on assumptions about the nature of judicial decision-
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making and the inner workings of judicial institutions that appear largely unwarranted. To be 
fair, there is increasing recognition that an argument whether pro or contra judicial review 
needs to be grounded in an account of how real-world judges – not angels in robe – decide 
cases and interact with their political environment. Aware of this shortcoming in the 
normative discussion, Jeremy Waldron specifies that his objections to judicial review are 
premised on a certain understanding of the way in which democratic and judicial institutions 
work (Waldron 2005). Going one step further, Richard Bellamy’s critique of legal 
constitutionalism makes numerous references to the public law literature in political science 
and the work of Martin Shapiro (Bellamy 2007: 5). Still, these efforts have fallen short of 
bridging the gap between the normative literature and empirical research on judicial 
behaviour. This is regrettable because the failure to take the empirical dimension seriously 
makes the normative discussion both less meaningful for the public at large and less relevant 
for policy-makers. As John Ferejohn points out: 
[I]t seems impossible to engage in meaningful normative discourse – to criticize a 
practice or give advice – without some conception of how political institutions either do 
or could be made to work. Without some conception of the politically possible, 
normative advice is inherently vulnerable to utopian impulses. (Ferejohn 1995: 192.) 
Normative arguments based on romanticized, naïve or idealized representations of political 
reality are often superficially attractive. Yet they are largely useless if they come without a 
roadmap detailing how our dirty, messy and unjust institutions are to be turned into the 
proffered ideal.  
In this essay I seek to bring insights from delegation theory, industrial organization 
and the empirical research on judicial behaviour to bear on the normative debate. I use 
delegation theory to contrast two distinct approaches to the justification of judicial review 
that I take to be implicit in the debate:  
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1) Following the Agent Model, judges are given the authority to review and to invalidate 
legislation to enforce the choices of the constitutional framers over recalcitrant 
legislative majorities.  
2) Under the Trustee Model, judges are given the power of judicial review to act as 
trustees of the political system: their task is to ensure that the legislative process 
produces the “best” outcome or, at least, Pareto-optimal policy.  
These two models correspond to distinct conceptions of the role of judges and each bears a 
different relation to traditional notions such as constitutionalism, democracy and the rule of 
law. The central question, however, is whether the courts’ organizational setting and the 
judges’ incentive structure actually ensure that judicial review work as the accepted model 
prescribes. As it exists in today’s democracies, judicial review, I contend, is both closer to 
and easier to justify under the Trustee Model. The institutional design of courts exercising 
judicial review does more to ensure independence and output legitimacy than to guarantee 
that constitutional judges act as indefectible agents of the constitutional framers. 
Nevertheless, even taking the normative assumptions of the Trustee Model for granted, the 
case for judicial review is by no means straightforward. If the institution it is to be defended 
as more than a “sometime thing” (“I like judicial review because I happen to benefit from 
decision X or Y”), the Trustee approach is fraught with problems. In many countries, the 
impact of judicial review is not circumscribed to regulatory issues but extends to 
redistributive policies. In the absence of even remotely intersubjective criteria to evaluate 
judicial outcomes, a defence of judicial review based on the idea that judges operate as 
policy-optimizers faces serious difficulties. What is more, even if we consider that the 
judges’ power to annul legislative enactments should be limited to specific policy areas 
where we stand to gain most from the institution, the mechanisms that would prevent courts 
from overstepping their boundaries remain to be invented. 
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 The paper has three sections. The first introduces the basics of delegation theory and 
sets out the Agent/Trustee distinction in more details. The second section assesses the 
distance that separates the Agent Model from the reality of judicial practice. The third section 
does the same for the Trustee Model. 
Agents and Trustees: Judicial Review through the Lens of Delegation Theory 
First developed in organizational and transaction costs economics from common law 
concepts of agency (Moe 1985; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 3), delegation theory is not 
really a theory as it does not spell out tight propositions or predictions about when, why and 
how delegation will take place. Rather it is best understood, especially in the context of the 
present paper, as a heuristic device: it provides an analytical framework to problematize the 
phenomenon of delegation, the transfer of authority by one party to another.
1
 
The Principal-Agent Model 
The Principal-Agent (P-A) model constitutes undoubtedly delegation theory’s most 
prominent offshoot. It addresses the difficulties that may arise when a party, the principal, 
hires another, the agent, to act on her behalf. As in employer/employee relations, the agent’s 
preferences and interests may differ from those of the principal. Hence the principal-agent 
problem: what mechanisms can the principal use or devise to ensure that the agent act in 
accordance with the terms of the delegation? The analysis of particular delegation schemes 
thus becomes a study of the various incentives and control mechanisms – the combination of 
                                                          
1
 In some contexts, though, delegation theory and the principal-agent framework take the character of an 
ontological assumption. A principal-agent relationship is first posited and the task of the empirical scholar is 
then conceived as that of unraveling the hidden mechanisms by which the principal achieve or fail to control 
the agent, see e.g. Garrett and Weingast (1993). For a discussion of the problems raised by such use of 
delegation theory see Alter (2007). 
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carrot and stick – that principals have at their disposal to control the behaviour of their 
agents: commissions, profit sharing, re-contracting, threat of dismissal etc… In political 
science, the P-A approach was first put to use in the United States in studies examining the 
delegation of legislative authority to regulatory agencies (Pollack 2002). These studies 
claimed that the power of an agency was a function of the intensity of legislative oversight, 
with the zone of discretion enjoyed by the technocrats determined by the sum of all delegated 
powers, minus the sum of all control mechanisms available to the legislators. When 
legislators have control over its budget, may easily discharge its staff, roll back its 
jurisdiction and overrule its decisions, an agency, the argument goes, will tend to kowtow to 
the legislators’ preferences. Conversely, when these instruments of control are lacking or 
difficult to wield, the agency will have opportunities to deviate from the legislators’ preferred 
position. This literature suggests the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of 
delegation, which requires that agents have enough authority and autonomy to accomplish 
their mission, and the costs (“agency loss”) associated with the risk that the agents deviate 
from the terms of the act of delegation. For a legislature delegation will be opportune only 
when the benefits outweigh the costs.  
The Trustee Framework 
The Trustee framework is an alternative to the P-A model. In common law, a trust is a 
contract by which a party, the settlor, grants some property or good to be administered by a 
second party, the trustee, on behalf of a third, the beneficiary.
2
 A typical example is a will 
trust, whereby a testator designates a trustee for the execution of his will. Other illustrations 
are pension and charitable trusts. The trustee is not meant to take her cue from the settlor but 
to act in the beneficiary’s “best interest”, which does not necessarily coincide with what the 
                                                          
2
 Note, however, that the settlor and the beneficiary can be one and the same person. 
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beneficiary sees as her short-term best interest. It is why the crucial issue in setting up a trust 
are not the available prods that would ensure that the trustee’s behaviour is aligned with the 
preferences of either the settlor or the beneficiary. Instead the crucial issue is the personality 
of the trustee herself. Trustees are supposed to be wise and prudent – i.e. “trustable” – 
persons. Fees and other sweeteners may constitute an additional motivation to act in the 
beneficiary’s best interest. But the rationale for entrusting the administration of a property to 
a trustee rather than to its beneficiary results primarily from a consideration of the trustee’s 
personal reputation. Setting up a trustee makes sense only insofar as the person acting as 
trustee is held to have a sense of prudence or a degree of wisdom or expertise superior to the 
beneficiary and even superior to the settlor. 
In economics, it has been argued that independent central banks fit a Trustee rather 
than a P-A model. Independent central banks are entrusted with the power to set interest rates 
and issue bank regulations for the citizens’ best interest. Independence is meant to insulate 
central bankers not only from the pressure of the settlor, the elected government who set up 
the bank, but also from the citizenry, as both may be tempted to sacrifice long term interests 
for short term benefits (Rasmusen 1997). Similarly, in political science, Giandomenico 
Majone has argued that the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
European Court of Justice are best thought of as trustees rather than as agents of the Member 
States and their citizens. The remarkable degree of independence enjoyed by EU institutions 
cannot be explained by the failure of the control mechanisms established by the Member 
States because their independence is grounded in the very act of delegation, the Treaty 
provisions that set them up. By enshrining the institutions’ authority in European Treaties and 
by making Treaty amendments difficult to pass, Member State governments have deliberately 
relinquished the powers to control their course of action (Majone 2005: 64-82, 2001). 
 Delegation, Legitimacy and Courts 
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As with central banks and regulatory agencies, delegation theory can be applied to courts and 
judges to problematize the decision of constitution-makers to entrust judges with the power 
of invalidating the laws enacted by elected officials. The P-A and Trustee framework help 
contrast two distinct logics of delegation to judicial institutions, which in turn identify two 
ways of justifying judicial review. Under the P-A approach, the constitutional framers, acting 
as principals, delegate to judges, acting as agents, the power to invalidate legislative acts to 
prevent violations of the constitution. The logic of delegation is one of precommitment and 
rests on three assumptions. First, the constitution-makers want the legislature to comply with 
the constitutional norms they have enacted. Second, it is believed that legislators may at times 
be tempted to disregard their constitutional obligations. Third, it is believed (a) that judges 
are more likely than legislators to have preferences congruent with those of the framers, 
and/or (b) that the judges’ expertise and incentive structure as well as the courts’ institutional 
design make judges more sensitive to and more likely to behave in accordance with the 
choices made by the constitution-makers. Within the P-A framework, the case for judicial 
review will turn on the validity of these assumptions. Thus understood, the case for judicial 
review is one of input legitimacy: if judicial review is legitimate it is not because it produces 
good or optimal policies, but because it ensures that laws and policies are made in accordance 
with the rules and principles spelled out in the constitution. What matters is not whether the 
practice makes citizens richer, freer and happier, but whether it promotes the supremacy of 
the constitution. 
 The Trustee Model, by contrast, casts the case for judicial review in terms that are 
unambiguously consequentialist. The function of a constitutional court is not to enforce the 
preferences of the members of the constitutional convention who set it up. Nor is it to cater to 
the will and desires of those who are meant to be the beneficiaries of the constitutional 
contract, the people. Rather, the function of such a trustee court is to improve the quality of 
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legislation, to enhance the efficiency of public policies and, if possible, to facilitate the 
smooth functioning of the political system. This also means that the Trustee Model best 
combines not with input but with output legitimacy. Under the Trustee Model, defending the 
practice of judicial review is a matter of showing that there is empirical evidence to back up 
juridical claims to output legitimacy. As for independent central banks, the case for judicial 
review will hinge on an empirical demonstration that judicial institutions and those who sit on 
the bench do make a significant improvement, at least in the long term, on what policy 
outcomes would be in their absence.  
Challenges to the Agent Model: Incomplete Contracts, Multiple Principals and Judicial 
Activism 
The Agent Model captures traditional understandings of the role of courts in a constitutional 
democracy committed to the rule of law and the separation of powers. Constitutionalism 
emphasises the notion of limited government. It recommends that the rules constituting the 
polity and establishing its citizens’ basic rights be entrenched to secure the stability of the 
political system as well as its commitment to individual freedom. Hence, inasmuch as judges 
are viewed as agents of the constitution-makers, it seems natural to regard judicial review as a 
means to achieve this end. Similarly, the rule of law stresses the ideal of “government by 
law” and sees courts as crucial in protecting citizens against arbitrary governmental 
decisions. Thus granting judges the power to review legislative acts may be seen, from the 
perspective of the Agent Model, as a means to consolidate the rule of law by subjecting the 
entire state apparatus to government by law. The Agent Model sits equally well with 
conventional separation of powers doctrines. Indeed, it is consonant with the idea underlying 
commonly held conceptions of the separation of powers that the judiciary fulfils a function 
distinct from the other two branches. Another attractive feature of the Agent Model is that it 
seems to make judicial review compatible with democracy. After all, if the job of a court 
The Case for Judicial Review: Judges as Agents and Judges as Trustees – ARTHUR DYEVRE, CEPC 
 11 
exercising judicial review is only to enforce the rules enacted by the constitution-makers, the 
fact that judges occasionally disallow the policies of democratically elected legislators should 
not be so objectionable as long as the rules in question were themselves adopted through a 
democratic procedure. Freeman, a staunch advocate of judicial review, sums up this argument 
as follows: 
By granting to a non-legislative body that is not electorally accountable the power to 
review democratically enacted legislation, citizens provide themselves with a means for 
protecting their sovereignty and independence from the unreasonable exercise of their 
political rights in legislative processes…By agreeing to judicial review they in effect tie 
themselves into their unanimous agreement on the equal basic rights that specify their 
sovereignty. Judicial review is then one way to protect their status as equal citizens 
(Freeman 1990: 36). 
The fitting analogy is with Ulysses who, having decided he should be tied to his mast in order 
to resist the charms of the sirens, instructs his crew “if I beg you to release me, you must 
tighten and add to my bonds” (Elster 1984: 36).  
Finally, the Agent Model fits the rhetoric judges typically appeal to to justify their 
rulings. When their decisions come under attack, judges tend to resort to the argument that 
“they’re only applying the law”. In his opening statement before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, John Roberts, subsequently confirmed as Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, 
famously compared the role of a judge to that of an umpire in a ball game: 
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like 
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a 
The Case for Judicial Review: Judges as Agents and Judges as Trustees – ARTHUR DYEVRE, CEPC 
 12 
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. 
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.
3
 
In similar fashion, on its official homepage, the German Federal Constitutional Court insists 
that, whatever the consequences of its decisions, its function is not “political” but purely 
“legal”:  
The decisions of the Court do have political consequences. This is most evidently the case 
when the Court declares a statute unconstitutional. However, the Court is not a political 
body. Its one and only standard of review is the Basic Law. Considerations of political 
expediency do not play any role for the Court.
4
  
Also in line with the Agent Model, constitutional courts often describe themselves as 
“guardians of the constitution”.5 
 Equating juridical reasoning with syllogistic logic and portraying courts as the mere 
“mouth of the law”, many Enlightenment thinkers – among them Becarria, Kant, Hamilton, 
                                                          
3
 For similar statements by Spanish and Portuguese constitutional judges see Magalhães (2003). 
4
 See http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/organisation/aufgaben.html.  
5
 See for example the French Constitutional Council : http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/fran cais/a-la-une/septembre-2009-le-conseil-constitutionnel-et-le-patrimoine.45725.html (“the 
Constitutional Council, guardian of the Constitution”), and : http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/2009/decisions-par-date/ 2009/2009-580-dc/communique-de-
presse.42667.html (“guardian of the Constitution’s rights and freedoms”). See also the address by the Council’s 
President, Jean-Louis Debré: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/discours_interventions/2007/20070919Debre.pdf (“[the Council Council] is thus 
integrated as guardian of the Constitution to the legislative process”). For similar statements (“Hüter der 
Verfassung”) by the German Federal Constitutional Court see decisions BVerfGE 1, 184 [195]; 40, 88 [93]; as 
well as decision of 19 September 2007, BVerfG 2 BvF 3/02 [para. 39]. 
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Condorcet and Montesquieu – espoused a legalistic conception of judging akin to the one 
underlying the Agent Model (La Torre 2002). Perhaps due to the perception that the 
Enlightenment values on which modern liberal democracies claim to be founded presuppose 
such a conception of adjudication, most citizens seem to view judicial institutions through the 
lens of the Agent Model. They do not object to judges invalidating legislation and 
overturning the policies of their elected representatives for they take it to be a logical 
consequence of judges impartially upholding the constitutional compact.
6
 Not least because 
the public at large believes in the Agent Model, politicians and legal scholars are disinclined 
to endorse a divergent understanding of judicial review. Even when they criticise the courts, 
politicians seldom question the soundness of the Agent Model as standard for the evaluation 
of judicial practices. In fact, far from challenging the Agent Model, the detractors of “judicial 
activism” perpetuate it just as much as the supporters of the judicial cause. Indeed, what they 
denounce is not the Model’s soundness but the judges’ failure to live up to it. In the United 
States for example, Republican presidents and candidates for the oval office ritually promise 
to appoint judges “who closely hew to the law rather than judicial activists…prone to 
legislate from the bench” (Kmiec 2004: 1471; Stephenson 1999: 181). Although legal 
scholars are willing to admit that syllogistic thinking is not all there is to judging, they tend to 
                                                          
6
 Studies examining public attitudes towards the judiciary show that people who are more educated and more 
attentive to the courts also tend to be more favourably oriented towards them. Interestingly, this line of 
research reveals that respondents who are more knowledgeable about courts and things judicial are more, not 
less, likely to subscribe to the mythology of judicial neutrality and objectivity in decision-making. Caldeira 
suggests that one reason why greater awareness of judicial institutions creates a less realistic view of the 
nature of judging is that more familiarity with the court system implies more exposure to judicial rhetoric: “to 
know courts is to love them, because to know them is to be exposed to a series of legitimizing messages 
focused on the symbols of justice, judicial objectivity and impartiality” (Caldeira 1998: 345). 
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reject the notion that judges are political actors. In Europe in particular, law professors have 
little taste for and are often highly suspicious of studies approaching judges as policy-seekers 
and describing adjudication in explicitly political terms (Dyevre 2008; Stone 1992). 
The question, however, is whether the Agent Model constitutes an accurate or at least 
a plausible representation of reality. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate why it does 
not. 
Constitutions as Incomplete Contracts: Law’s Indeterminacy and the Overrepresentation of 
Indeterminate Cases in Constitutional Litigation 
One reason the Agent Model does not constitute an even remotely plausible account of how 
judicial review functions in practice has to do with the indeterminacy of constitutional 
language. Of course, not all constitutional norms are indeterminate. Think, for example, of 
the US Constitution requirement that the person occupying the office of president be at least 
35 years of age. Or consider the formula by which the German Basic Law sets the number of 
votes for large and small Länder in the Bundesrat
7
 or the provision fixing the number of 
rounds in the presidential election in the French Constitution. Generally speaking, when 
constitutional rules have a constitutive character, as opposed to a regulatory one, they tend to 
be relatively clear and straightforward. The rules that create the office of president, establish 
courts, confer upon the actions of a group of individuals the meaning of legislative act etc. do 
not – and for that matter cannot – leave much to ambiguity. So obviously there are some 
                                                          
7
 Article 52 Basic Law : 
Each Land shall have at least three votes; Länder with more than two million inhabitants shall have 
four, Länder with more than six million inhabitants five, and Länder with more than seven million 
inhabitants six votes. 
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constitutional issues for which there is a single right answer: Who is the current president of 
the United States? Does Italy have a bicameral or a unicameral parliament? Does the present 
essay count as a decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court? Nevertheless, my 
point here is that such questions are seldom raised in the course of litigation. Rules that are 
constitutive in character or possess a clear and definite meaning hardly feature at all in the 
cases effectively brought before supreme and constitutional tribunals. The rules making up a 
legal system address all sorts of real or merely potential social conflicts. Yet not all these 
social conflicts are brought before a judge and those that are appear to be precisely those vis-
à-vis which the law is the most indeterminate. Other things being equal, a case that admits of 
several, equally right answers seems more likely to be brought before a court and to make it 
to highest rung of the judicial hierarchy than a clear, straightforward case.  
The reason it is so is because the decision to file a lawsuit is determined by several 
parameters. The litigant has to weigh the probable gain from a favourable ruling against the 
potential cost in time, money, effort and reputation associated with a defeat. So, to the extent 
that a clear and unambiguous rule may indicate high probability of a favourable or, on the 
contrary, of an unfavourable ruling, the degree of determinacy of the law is likely to affect a 
litigant’s cost-benefit analysis and, therefore, her decision to initiate legal action. As long as 
courts are expected to uphold the law in cases where it is clear and unequivocal, litigants who 
expect to lose will have an incentive to renounce lodging a lawsuit and to offer a settlement 
when the adverse party threatens to bring the matter before a judge. 
Figure 1 about here 
As suggested by Figure 1, considering all possible social disputes and not just the cases 
brought before a tribunal, it is quite possible that there is overall more clear cases – i.e. social 
disputes vis-à-vis which the law is determinate – than indeterminate ones. Yet considering 
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only the cases actually brought before the courts the share of indeterminate cases seems much 
higher and more so as we go up the court hierarchy. Attorneys together with first instance and 
appeal judges seem to operate as filters, winnowing the hard cases from the easy ones. To be 
sure, not all litigants are legal experts and many may wrongly believe that the law is on their 
side when in fact it clearly is not. But a visit to a lawyer’s office will usually suffice to 
dissuade them from bringing a case certain to fail. Occasionally a litigant will choose to 
ignore her lawyer’s advice or will be drawn before the courts to face a sure defeat because 
she did not expect that the other party would have the resource to file a lawsuit. So, from to 
time to time clear cases will manage to seep through the first filter and reach first instance 
tribunals. Still, as it becomes clear that the judges will stick to the letter of the law, few easy 
cases will be appealed and still fewer will make it to the topmost courts. This is why we 
should expect to find on the docket of supreme and constitutional courts precisely the cases 
vis-à-vis which the law is the most indeterminate.8 
 Figures reveal that over the 1973-1995 period the Constitutional Council invoked the 
principle of equality as a basis for its decision in 39 % of its rulings (Melin-Soucramanien 
1997: 17). Equality, the “fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic” and 
other similarly indeterminate constitutional provisions are the most frequent legal grounds in 
decisions pronouncing the unconstitutionality of a statute.
9
 Likewise, in Germany the most 
                                                          
8
 This argument was made early on by American legal realists who argued that adjudication made legal rules 
appear more indeterminate than they really are because clear cases are settled outside the court system 
(Leiter 1997: 273; Llewellyn 1931: 1239; Radin 1942: 1271). 
9
 Recueil de jurisprudence constitutionnelle, Paris : Litec, 1994, p.4. These figures suggest that the argument 
from the overrepresentation of indeterminate cases in litigation applies equally well in the context of abstract 
review where only politicians have the right to challenge legislative acts. In fact the argument may be even 
stronger in this context. Indeed, for the opposition the cost of a referral, even an unsuccessful one, is relatively 
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frequently recurring constitutional clause in the FCC’s jurisprudence turns out to be Article 2 
(1) of the Basic Law, which provides a right to “the free development of one’s personality” 
(Dyevre 2008). Similar to France, the equality clause is the most popular constitutional 
provision in litigation before the Constitutional Court of Austria (Jakab 2007: 288). In the 
US, the status of most frequently invoked constitutional provision is assumed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, followed by its equal protection guaranty 
(Schauer 1985). 
 Every time a court strikes down a law, the alleged justification is virtually always that 
the legislature has violated the constitution. Yet these figures suggest that what the court is 
really doing most of the time is substituting one linguistically possible reading of the 
constitution, its own, for another linguistically possible reading of the constitution, the 
legislature’s. In practice, judicial review is not about ensuring compliance with the decisions 
of the framers. If the constitution is seen as a contract, then the job of a constitutional court is 
not to guarantee that its terms are respected. Instead, it seems more accurate to say that its job 
is to put flesh on the contract’s incomplete clauses. 
Judges Are Policy-Seekers 
The Agent Model seems to presuppose that judging is essentially about legal expertise and 
that ideology and attitudes do little to explain judicial behaviour. However, there is 
compelling evidence that this is wrong and that judicial outcomes vary significantly 
depending on who is sitting on the bench. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
low and the benefits potentially large in case of victory. So, knowing the opposition will have an incentive to 
refer to the constitutional court any statute contradicting the letter of the constitution, the legislative majority 
will be careful to stay within the limits of what the constitution clearly forbids. 
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 The effect of ideology on judicial outcomes is well established by research on the US 
Supreme Court. Using newspaper editorials to rank judges on liberal-conservative scale, 
Spaeth and Segal find a strong correlation between the attitudes and the votes on the merits of 
Supreme Court Justices. On this measure, ideology alone explains 57 per cent of the variance 
in the votes cast (Spaeth and Segal 2002). Recent studies have shown that the preferences of 
individual judges constitute a good predictor of judicial outcomes on courts outside the 
United States too. Taking the political orientation of the appointing authority as proxy for the 
judges’ attitudes, research on the Portuguese and Spanish constitutional courts (Magalhães 
2003), the French Constitutional Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Hönnige 2007, 2009; Brouard 2009; Frank 2009) as well as the European Court of Human 
Rights (Voten 2006, 2008) has found significant correlations between ideology and judicial 
decision-making. Christoph Hönnige demonstrates that the probability of the Constitutional 
Council annulling a law goes down when the number of judges appointed by the legislative 
majority goes up. For instance, when five judges (out of nine) have been appointed by the 
opposition and the odds that the Council annuls a law are one to one (i.e. a probability of 
50%) the legislative majority may lower the odds to one to two (33% probability) by 
appointing one more judge to secure a 5:4 majority (Hönnige 2009). In Germany, the Federal 
Constitutional Court is a widely revered institution and questions regarding possible political 
bias among its judges are rarely raised. But a close examination of the Court’s output 
suggests a different story. Of the 31 dissenting opinions filed between 1974 and 2002 in 
abstract review cases, 24 (77%) were authored by a judge appointed by the political party 
loosing the case. The remaining seven were filed by a “mixed” pair of judges, with one 
appointed by the victorious and one by the losing political party (Hönnige 2007: 201). What 
makes the German Court look impartial is not its members’ supposedly exclusive 
preoccupation with the law. Rather, it is the requirement of a 5:3 supermajority to strike 
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down laws combined with an agreed practice of the two main parties – the Christian-
Democrats and the Social-Democrats – following which each party gets to select half the 16 
judges sitting on the Court’s two Senates. Only between 1975-1976 in the first Senate and 
1976-1987 in the second did the Court’s composition depart from this practice, with the 
Christian-Democrats enjoying a 5:3 majority. Yet it is precisely between 1975 and 1982, 
when Liberal and Social-Democrats where in power under the leadership of Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, that we observe the Court’s highest annulment rates. Regressing the 
probability of the Court finding for the legislative majority on the Court’s ideological 
composition reveals a strong correlation. If the probably that a non-convergent Court – that is 
a Court in which the opposition holds a majority – finds against the legislative majority is 
25% (one to three), it drops to 5% (one to 19) with a convergent Court (Hönnige 2007). 
 The judicial politics literature implies that a change in judicial personnel may often 
produce a change in judicial outcomes. In a sense this is not a very surprising finding. Indeed, 
French and American Presidents, Spanish and German parliamentary groups and those 
holding the power to appoint judges in general, all seek to promote – at least so is the 
impression – candidates who share their policy-preferences on some key or salient issue. 
Why would they care about appointing judges if policy-preferences did not play any role in 
adjudication? What matters, however, from the standpoint of the Agent Model is that judicial 
drift appears to be a real possibility and not just a hypothetical scenario. As preferences vary 
from judge to judge and over time, there is no guaranty that a constitutional court’s agenda 
will coincide with that of the framers. 
Divisions among Multiple Principals: Constitutional Rigidity and Judicial Activism 
Can constitution-makers do anything to prevent judicial drift? Ex ante procedures like having 
judicial appointees take an oath of allegiance to the constitution do not look very effective. In 
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fact, to suggest, as part of a defence of judicial review, that a mere oath to observe the 
constitution will suffice to dissuade judges from deviating from the framers’ position seems 
self-defeating. Indeed, if an oath of office were enough to ensure that officials behave in 
accordance with constitutional norms, judicial review would be little more than an expensive 
superfluity. For compliance with the constitution could be achieved equally well and at a 
lesser cost by requiring legislators and cabinet members – as they are in some countries10 – to 
take an oath of allegiance to the constitutional compact. In addition, because the public tends 
to believe that the law and the constitution are what the courts say they are (Caldeira 1998: 
345), the argument could made that such oaths of office are even less likely to have an effect 
on the behaviour of judicial officials than on that of other state officials.  
On the face of things, ex post procedures offer a more effective means to rein in the 
judges.  The ex post control mechanisms constitution-makers have at their disposal resemble 
those available to legislators overseeing regulatory agencies. Sitting as constitution-amending 
power, they can, in principle, respond to any ruling they dislike by passing an amendment 
overriding the decision, rolling back the court’s jurisdiction or lowering the judges’ salary. 
Moreover, we should expect the mere threat to change the constitution to feed back on 
judicial decision-making, deterring judges from straying in the first place. 
                                                          
10
 E.g. US Constitution, Article VI clause 3: 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or 
affirmation, to support this Constitution; 
The oath of office for the President is specified in Article II, Section 1: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will 
to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. 
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However, the effectiveness of the mechanism presupposes that the threat is a credible 
one and that those wielding it may really put it to execution. Yet constitutions are often 
difficult to revise. When modifications to the constitutional charter are subject to prior 
approval by a supermajority in both the lower and the upper chamber of the legislature and 
ratification by popular referendum, no amendment may be successfully enacted unless there 
is a broad consensus on the necessity of constitutional change. Generally speaking, the more 
rigid the constitution, the more actors will be in position to block an attempt to override the 
courts. This clearly favours judges. A more rigid constitution means they will have less 
reason to worry about override amendments and will have more room to pursue their own 
policy agenda. Figure 2 helps grasp the logic of the argument.  
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 depicts a policy space in which the actors have preferences along two dimensions – 
here decentralisation and property rights, two issues commonly debated in constitutional 
conventions. Each actor is assumed to prefer an outcome closer to her ideal-point to an 
outcome further from her ideal-point. Here three political parties – A,B and C – agree on 
constitutional compromise X which the Court is then responsible to apply to concrete cases. 
In case the Court moves away from X the three parties may pass a constitutional amendment 
by unanimous approval. Yet we can see that all outcomes within the A-B-C triangle are 
Pareto-optimal. This means that any change to an outcome within the triangle will necessarily 
make one of the parties less well off. So if the Court moves the outcome to Y, which is closer 
to its ideal-point, party C will want to push for an override amendment, since Y is farther 
from its ideal-point than X (Y < X),. But A and B will have an incentive to oppose an 
override amendment because Y is closer to their preferred position than X (Y > X). The 
argument can be pushed further. The Court does not even need to parties on its side. The 
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support of only one part will be enough as long as it is better off with the judicially enacted 
outcome.  
 More constitutional rigidity means more actors involved in the constitution-amending 
process, which in turn means a higher probability that an actor will prefer the judicial 
outcome to any override amendment proposed. Put in the language of delegation theory, a 
more rigid constitution means multiple principals will be involved in monitoring the activity 
of judicial agents. So whenever re-contracting is contemplated in response to an instance of 
judicial drift disagreement is more likely with the effect that the agents are effectively 
protected from punishment. 
 This argument is buttressed by empirical evidence showing a correlation between 
constitutional rigidity and judicial activism. Using data from Lijphart (1999), Figure 3 shows 
the relationship between constitutional rigidity and judicial activism in 35 countries.  
Figure 3 about here 
These measures are not indisputable. One may be surprised for example to find Israel’s 
judiciary among the least activist or the French constitution as so flexible in comparison with 
the German one. However, the correlation is preserved when we use measures developed by 
other authors, such as Lutz (1994) and Laporta et al. (2003) for constitutional rigidity and 
Cooter and Ginsburg (1998) for judicial activism. 
Judges Simply Don’t Care for the Framers: the Living Constitution, Balancing and the 
Demise of Originalist Theories of Interpretation 
If judges really cared about the framers’ preferences, then they should follow something 
resembling an originalist theory of interpretation. It is not quite what we see in practice. 
Many important constitutional decisions appear to fly in the face of the original 
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understanding of the provision they purport to apply. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment were meant to apply exclusively to matters of procedure 
(Harrison 1998; Easterbrook 1982). Yet countless are the decisions where the Supreme Court 
applies them to matters of substance. The oxymoron “substantive due process” has become 
one of the Court’s most salient doctrines (Ely 1980). Likewise, the reference to the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and to the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution in the 
Preamble of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was thought of as a reverential homage 
carrying no legal weight. But the Constitutional Council turned it into hard law, with the 
1946 Preamble and the Declaration serving as justification for the Council’s activist 
jurisprudence (Stone 1992).
11
 
 Generally speaking, courts have favoured loose constructions and flexible standards 
over rigid doctrines and strict interpretive regimes. The dominant paradigm of global 
constitutionalism is the “living constitution” rather than the originalist approach defended by 
Justice Antonin Scalia in the United States (Scalia 1997). In the same vein, the tendency of 
judges to rely on balancing and means/ends standards like proportionality to frame 
constitutional issues has made constitutional law even more indeterminate than it already was 
(Stone Sweet and Matthews 2008).   
What Kind of Institutional Design Would the Agent Model Require? 
                                                          
11
 That cases invoking the Preamble of the French Constitution or the application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause to matters of substance made to it, respectively, to the Constitutional Council 
and to the Supreme Court may seem to run counter to what we said above about indeterminacy and the 
under-representation of clear cases in litigation. However, this fact is perfectly compatible with the theory set 
out above because the belief that clear and straightforward legal norms constitute a reliable indication of how 
a particular issue will be adjudicated is only the default assumption of litigants and courts can effectively cast 
off that assumption.  
The Case for Judicial Review: Judges as Agents and Judges as Trustees – ARTHUR DYEVRE, CEPC 
 24 
Where judicial review comes closest to the Agent Model is perhaps in Scandinavia. The 
Finnish and Swedish Constitutions spell out a “clear mistake rule” whereby courts have the 
power to set aside legislative acts but only in case of “evident” or “manifest” contradiction 
with the constitution.
12
 So far the courts have not evinced any intent to broaden or loosen the 
definition of these terms and a clear case of constitutional violation by the legislature has yet 
to be identified (Lijphart 1999; Ferreres Comella 2004: 1732). So it might be said that the 
beauty of judicial review Scandinavian style is that it is never exercised. 
 Why Swedish and Finnish judges have carefully observed the clear mistake rule and 
resisted the siren calls of judicial activism is a question that still waits for an empirical 
answer. A tentative explanation for Sweden would point to its strongly majoritarian 
parliamentary system as well as to its Constitution’s relatively flexible revision procedure. 
Judges tend to be less activist where political power is less fragmented (Dyevre 2010). The 
electoral and parliamentary dominance of the Social Democratic Party during most of 
Sweden’s post-war history may have persuaded judges they had to count with override 
constitutional amendments as a real possibility. For both countries, however, political culture 
is the explanation that most naturally offers itself. Accordingly what holds back Scandinavian 
                                                          
12
 Section 106 of the Finnish Constitution of 11 June 1999: 
If, in a matter being tried by a court of law, the application of an Act turns out to be in evident conflict with the 
Constitution, the court of law shall give primacy to the provision in the Constitution. 
Chapter 11, Article 14 of the Instrument of Government: 
If a court or other public body finds that a provision conflicts with a rule of fundamental law or other superior 
statute, or finds that a procedure laid down in law has been disregarded in any important respect when the 
provision was made, the provision shall not be applied. If the provision has been approved by the Riksdag or by 
the Government, however, it shall be waived only if the error is manifest. 
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judges from activist impulses is a widespread and deep-seated scepticism towards non-
majoritarian institutions. 
 Nevertheless, even if we take this to be true and we accept that the Finnish and 
Swedish systems fit the Agent Model, it still fails to provide justification for judicial review 
as it exists in countries like Germany, India, France or the United States. For these we need 
another model. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Trustee Model: Judges as Policy-Optimizers 
At first blush, the Trustee Model departs from conventional justifications for granting judges 
the power to invalidate legislation. That judges are sometimes better qualified than elected 
officials to decide what is best for society is not an argument that is often made explicitly in 
public debates. Yet many proponents of judicial review implicitly admit that it is the real 
rationale for the institution. They are fully aware of the indeterminacy of constitutional 
norms. Miguel Herrero de Miñon, one of the Founding Fathers of the Spanish post-Francoist 
Constitution, observed that the Spanish constitution-makers had deliberately kept ambiguous 
a number of constitutional provisions on highly contentious issues, thus leaving their 
resolution to the newly constituted powers: 
[W]ith this Constitution, it is possible to legalize abortion or to forbid it; to keep the death 
penalty or to abolish it; (…) there is only an open door for divorce, but its full recognition 
through a future law cannot be squarely pinned down as unconstitutional
13 
That what matters is ultimately the courts’ output, not the will of the framers, is also implied 
by the doctrines that see the Constitution as a “living” document or a “living tree” which the 
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  Quoted by Magalhães (2003). 
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judges are in charge of developing according to society’s changing needs and values. The 
Canadian Supreme Court has made its adherence to this judicial philosophy explicit: 
The “frozen concepts” reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of 
Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree which, by way of 
progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life.
14
 
Writing for the Court in the case Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, Justice Antonio Lamer made no 
bones that this approach to adjudication entailed a complete disregard for the intent of the 
framers of the Canadian bill of rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom: 
If the newly planted “living tree” which is the Charter is to have the possibility of growth and 
adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials, such as the 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its 
growth.
15 
Because most ordinary citizens, as seen above, still believe in the mythology of judging, 
judicial bodies like the Canadian Supreme Court continue to describe their decision-making 
practice in terms of “interpretation” and “protecting rights”. Judges, in general, remain 
reluctant to come out as policy-makers. But many scholars are more candid. Richard Fallon 
and Mattias Kumm, for example, defend the practice of judicial review, but not on the 
grounds that courts are guardians of the constitution protecting constitutional rights and 
freedoms against corrupt and oppressive legislators. Kumm readily admits that constitutional 
rights are extremely vague and that proportionality analysis, as used in constitutional 
adjudication around the world, expose courts as policy-makers (Kumm 2009). Fallon also 
accepts that the case for judicial review cannot rest on an artificial dichotomy between law 
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 Re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R 698. 
15
 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, para. 53. 
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and politics (Fallon 2007). More importantly, the arguments they advance in support of the 
practice are ultimately institutional and outcome-based. In short, they argue that judicial 
review of legislation is legitimate because the design of judicial bodies and the way in which 
courts interact with their political environment help improve policy outcomes.   
Arguments along those lines fit the Trustee Model better than the Agent Model. Yet 
they all raise the same basic question: Why should we think that giving courts the right to 
amend and veto legislation will improve public welfare? As this section will demonstrate, 
from the standpoint of the Trustee Model, the case for judicial review is to a large extent 
similar to the one for independent central banks. Put in a nutshell, if society is better off with 
judicial review it is because judges enjoy institutional guarantees of independence that make 
them less inclined to pander to public opinion and more apt to make wise choices than elected 
officials. Now there are good reasons, empirical as well as theoretical, to think that 
institutional design allows courts to make decisions they would not make if they were subject 
to the same constraints as the other branches of power. But the claim that judges make wiser 
choices is more difficult to substantiate. To some extent, the problem is the same as for 
independent central banks. However, it is magnified by the range and diversity of issues that 
courts decide and have de facto judicialized. 
Acting as Autonomous Trustees: The Parameters of Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence can be understood both as the independence of the individual judge 
and as independence of the court or the judiciary as whole from external influences such as 
pressures from politicians and the electorate.  
Except for a small number of American states, judges are not democratically 
accountable. They are appointed, not elected, and cannot be removed once in office. High 
court judges enjoy life tenure (as in the United States) or serve fixed terms. At European 
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constitutional courts, judges serve an average nine year term. Fixed terms are generally non-
renewable, which removes an incentive for the individual judge to try to please her 
appointing authority as a way of securing re-appointment.
16
 
 No institution is external to society. So the independence of courts is matter of degree. 
Courts cannot be fully insulated from political pressure. But two factors seem to foster 
judicial autonomy. One, previously discussed, is constitutional rigidity. When political forces 
are divided and fragmented, a high level of constitutional rigidity means that courts have 
fewer reasons to fear the wrath of legislative majorities when they make decisions on 
controversial issues. The other factor, less intuitively, is public support. At first glance, it 
would seem that judicial autonomy cannot depend on public support, because, if so, judges 
would have an incentive to pander to the public. But this is not so. Research on the legitimacy 
of national high courts shows that citizens do not automatically withdraw their support when 
their courts make decisions they dislike. The explanation lies in the difference between 
specific support, support for particular decisions, and diffuse support, support for the 
institution. Unpopular decisions will enjoy low specific support without affecting diffuse 
support. As demonstrated by Vanberg (2005), this may even protect the courts from 
legislators who would otherwise be in position to reverse their decisions. The public may 
perceive a constitutional amendment seeking to override a ruling, even an unpopular one, as 
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 There is empirical evidence that term renewability does influence judicial behaviour, see Magalhães (2003) 
for the Portuguese Constitutional Court and Voeten (2006) for the European Court of Human Rights. In the 
absence of separate opinions, however, term renewability does not seem to affect the conduct of judicial 
appointees. This applies for the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Given the secrecy surrounding deliberation, 
national governments, who are responsible for appointing ECJ judges, are not in position to use their right to 
refuse renewal as an instrument of control. 
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an attempt to undermine a legitimate institution. So, to avoid a backlash and its potential 
electoral cost, politicians may prefer to leave the contentious decision undisturbed.  
Canada offers a prime example of how public support can make for the absence of 
political fragmentation and constitutional rigidity. Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, the so-called “notwithstanding clause”, allows the federal legislature or 
the legislature of a province to override judicial interpretations of the Charter by simple 
majority. Hence, given the strongly majoritarian outlook of Canada’s Westminster-style 
parliamentary democracy, one would expect the judiciary to be highly deferent towards the 
legislative branch. However, the role played by the Supreme Court in Canadian politics belies 
this prediction. The public’s perception of legislative overrides as undue interferences with 
judicial independence and the rule of law has turned the notwithstanding clause into 
something of a dead letter, thus allowing the Canadian Supreme Court to pursue an activist 
policy-agenda (Leishman 2006: 249-72). 
To be sure, the public’s reservoir of goodwill is not unlimited. If courts make too 
many unpopular decisions, there is a point at which specific support will begin to affect 
diffuse support. That is what apparently happened in Germany in the 1990s. The Federal 
Constitutional Court saw its popularity drop significantly in the mid-1990s in the wake of the 
controversy sparked by a series of rulings on sensitive issues. To contain the backlash, the 
Karlsruhe judges kept a low profile and exerted more restraint until the institutional support 
recovered and the Court could be restored to its status as post-war Germany most respected 
political institution (Vanberg 2005). Still, strong diffuse support allows judges to go away 
with unpopular decisions every once in a while. 
In most panegyric moments, the rhetoric of the rule of law portrays judges as 
benevolent and virtuous decision-makers endowed with semi-divine wisdom. Yet, at least at 
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the theoretical level, there is no need to assume that people in robe are somehow superior 
beings to believe that they can sometimes make more prudent choices than other officials. 
Maskin and Tirole build a formal model to compare the welfare effect of decision-making 
through direct democracy, elected officials and judges, but do not assume that judges have 
superior expertise compared to elected officials. All state officials are specialists in public 
decision-making. As such they are more likely to have the experience and information to 
make wise choices. What makes judges different is that they have much less incentive to 
pander to the public when they know that a particular action, though popular, is wrong. As 
for central banks, independence gives them a longer time-horizon than politicians who 
periodically face elections. Thus, the argument goes, they are less likely to postpone 
decisions that are unpopular but necessary or to sacrifice long-term benefits for reasons of 
political expediency. More specifically, when the public knows little about a particular issue 
but elected officials are primarily actuated by the desire to stay in office, judicial power may 
outperform representative democracy (Maskin and Tirole 2004). 
Congruent Courts: Appointing Mainstream Judges 
In the model developed by Maskin and Tirole, however, judicial power outperforms 
representative only to the extent that judges are not ideologically out of step with the citizens 
they are meant to serve. This points out the downside of decision-making by unaccountable 
officials: if a judge turns out to have a policy-agenda diametrically opposed to the preferences 
and values of the rest of society, there is no way to screen her out, at least until the end of her 
tenure (which often means until her death on the US Supreme Court). However, the 
impossibility to weed out noncongruent judges ex post is mitigated by the appointment 
procedure. The power to appoint supreme and constitutional court judges generally belongs 
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to the legislature and the head of the executive.
17
 Giving elected representative an input in the 
selection of candidates ensures that judicial appointees are not too far from the ideological 
mainstream. In Europe, the absence of life-tenure also reduces the risk that discrepancy may 
result from the passage of time. 
Pursuing Efficiency: Regulatory and Redistributive Policy 
For courts to operate as policy-optimizers presupposes that policies can be optimized. 
Optimization cannot mean that courts simply redistribute wealth, rights and power from one 
individual or group of individuals to another. Rather, it has to mean that courts improve what 
everyone gets. This suggests that the Trustee Model works better for regulatory than for 
redistributive policies. As Figure 4 illustrates, regulatory policies can and are supposed to 
produce outcomes that benefit everyone, whereas redistributive policies necessarily produce 
winners and losers. 
Figure 4 about here 
A policy moving the outcome from X to Z is an efficient regulatory policy because it 
improves the welfare of both individual A and B. It is Pareto-optimal in that it improves the 
overall welfare without making anyone less well off. By contrast, a policy moving the 
outcome from X to Y is not a regulatory but a redistributive policy. Its effect is to transfer 
wealth from B to A.  
With respect to regulatory issues, the claim that independence allows judges to make 
wiser decisions than elected officials takes on a more straightforward meaning. It means that 
independence makes courts more likely to produce Pareto-optimal outcomes. This argument 
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 In defending judicial review and the creation of a constitutional court, Kelsen had already argued that 
constitutional judges should be appointed by members of parliaments. 
The Case for Judicial Review: Judges as Agents and Judges as Trustees – ARTHUR DYEVRE, CEPC 
 32 
mirrors the one for independent central banks. Politicians running for re-election, economists 
say, may be tempted to exploit a possible short-term trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, even though the long-term effect of doing so is that unemployment returns to 
its initial level and inflation is higher. So, since low inflation benefits everyone in the long-
term, a country will make itself better off by entrusting its monetary policy to an independent 
central bank. 
There are two problems with this way of justifying judicial review, however. First, 
constitutional courts do not deal exclusively with regulatory issues. Many questions that 
judges typically grapple with at the constitutional level involve trade-offs which cannot be 
addressed without producing winners and losers. Liberty versus security in anti-terrorist 
legislation is a prime example. Making legislation Pareto-efficient in this context would mean 
that judges do not go beyond ensuring that the legislature has used the least-restrictive means 
to achieve its policy goal. Yet courts often go beyond least restrictive means tests, in effect 
deciding which goal should have priority and which should be sacrificed. This most 
obviously comes to the fore in cases where judges invoke proportionality (or strict scrutiny in 
the American context). Sometimes called “proportionality in the strict sense”, the last prong 
of the proportionality test has judges engaging in an act of balancing. But there are no 
intersubjective criteria by which this act of balancing could be called an optimization. In its 
influential work on rights adjudication, Robert Alexy proposes a “law of balancing”: when 
two principles or policies conflict, the greater the non-satisfaction of one principle, the 
greater must be the satisfaction of the other (Alexy 2003: 102). Yet Alexy does not offer 
anything resembling an intersubjective metric to establish whether the satisfaction of 
principle A is greater than the non-satisfaction of principle B. 
Second, the empirical evidence on the effect of independence on efficiency is mixed. 
Taking, again, the example of central banks, making them independent appears to have no 
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measurable impact on real economic performances (Alesina and Summers 1993). Even in 
what is supposed to be their central mission, fighting inflation, their record is not as 
convincing as one what would expect from the theoretical argument. And some argue that the 
correlation between independent central banks and low interest is spurious (Berman and 
McNamara 1999). 
These elements do not kill the case for judicial review. Nonetheless, they show that 
even under the Trustee Model the case is an uneasy one. 
Conclusion: Democracy and Distrust(ee) 
The empirical case for judicial review is stronger, though by no means unequivocal, under the 
Trustee than the Agent Model. However, the Trustee Model raises normative issues that 
could not be addressed in this paper. The most important one is its relation with democracy. 
Some denies that trustee-like institutions are antidemocratic because they are democratically 
unaccountable. Giandomenico Majone, for example, denies that EU institutions, like the 
Commission and the Court of Justice, suffer from a democratic deficit because these 
institutions, he argues, essentially deal with regulatory matters. In his view, democratic 
legitimacy is a requirement that only applies to redistributive legislation (Majone 1996). On 
the other side of the spectrum, some say the “dirty little secret” behind much of the legal 
scholarship supporting judicial review is “a discomfort with democracy” (Unger 1996: 72-3).  
Distrust of democratic institutions, however, has a long pedigree. Tocqueville famously 
questioned America’s ability to conduct a successful foreign policy because of the tendency 
of a democracy to “obey its feelings rather than its calculations and to abandon a long 
matured plan to satisfy a momentary passion”. 
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Figure 3: Constitutional Rigidity and Judicial Activism in 35 Democracies 
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